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SUMMARY. THE POLITICAL AMBIENCE REMAINS UNSETTLED AND TENSE AS OF MID-JULY. THE POPULAR (U.P.) GOVERNMENT HAS EMBARKED UPON AN ACCELERATED CAMPAIGN TO ARM AND TRAIN ITS SUPPORTERS FOR

> Declassified and Approved for Release July 2000

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WHAT IT NOW BELIEVES WILL BE AN INEVITABLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE OPPOSITION IN CHILE; THUS FARE IT HAS SHOWN NO INCLINATION TO RETURN THE FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIES WHICH WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 29 JUNE UPRISING BY A MILITARY UNIT. AS: THE U.P. IS IN AN AGGRESSIVE AND APPARENTLY UNYIELDING MOOD, THE LARGEST OPPOSITION FORCE, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), LIKEWISE APPEARS TO BE UNWILLING TO REDUCE TENSIONS UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT AGREES TO MEET CERTAIN CONDITIONS. CONCURRENT WITH THE MAJOR CAUSES OF UNREST IN CHILE ARE THE PLANS OF CHILEAN EXTREMISTS OF BOTH THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT, WHO APPEAR DETERMINED TO KEEP CHILEAN POLITICS EN ROUTE TO CONFRONTATION. ALSO, THE ECONOMIC SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE AND A SERIES OF NATIONAL STRIKES BY ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUILDS COULD AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION. THE FOLLOWING APPEAR TO BE THE MOST LIKELY ALTERNA-TIVES WHICH COULD DEVELOP OVER THE NEXT THREE-TO-SIX MONTH PERIOD: A) CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT ACUTE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE U.P. AND THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION WITH NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE CORRELATION OF FORCES; B) A GRADUAL SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF POWER TOWARD THE U.P. DURING A PERIOD OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT; C) REENTRANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES INTO THE GOVERNMENT

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WITH SUFFICIENT POWER TO ALTER THE REVOLUTIONARY THRUST OF THE U.P.; AND D) A MILITARY OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT.

31 VEN THE HIGH DEGREES OF POLITICAL TENSION, THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTREME ACTS BY EITHER PATRIA Y LIBERTAD OR THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT, AND THE RIGIDITY IN THE POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS POWER GROUPS, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE WITH ANY DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE AT THIS TIME WHICH OF THESE ALTERNATIVES IS THE MOST LIKELY. WHILE THE HISTORY OF PAST PERIODS OF HIGH TENSION WOULD TEND TO INDICATE THAT THIS CRISIS COULD ALSO PASS WITHOUT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE CURRENT BALANCE OF POWER IN CHILE, WE ARE NOT AS CONFIDENT OF THIS OUTCOME AS WE HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST. END SUMMARY.

1. THE UPRISING BY THE SECOND ARMOURED BATTALION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY ON 29 JUNE 1973 WAS AN ALMOST FUTILE GESTURE OF FRUSTRATION ON THE PART OF ACTION-ORIENTED MILITARY OFFICERS WHICH, WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES, WAS DOOMED TO FAILURE. THE UPRISING WAS A HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT EVENT WHICH HAS HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON POLITICO-MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE. THE UPRISING, IN EFFECT, BROUGHT TO THE FOREFRONT AND CRYSTALLIZED THE AGGREGATE OF PROBLEMS WHICH

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HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE PRIOR TO THAT DATE.

PRIOR TO MAY 1973, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE (PCCH) BELIEVED THAT TIME WAS ON THE SIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THAT LONG-RANGE STRATEGY DICTATED THE NEED FOR GRADUAL AND CONTINUAL CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER. FOR THIS REASON, THE PCCH, WITHIN THE U.P. COALITION, TOOK THE LEAD IN STRIVING FOR A RELATIVELY MODERATE COURSE OF ACTION: IT WAS WILLING TO COMPROMISE, WHEN NECESSARY, REVOLUTIONARY OBJECTIVES WITH PRACTICAL POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY AND THEREBY ACTED AS A RESTRAINED FORCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ON THE MORE EXTREMIST-ORIENTED U.P. SECTORS. IN LATE MAY, HOWEVER, THE PCCH CENTRAL COMMITTEE. DECIDED TO PROTEST AGAINST THE EXTREME WEAKNESS BEING SHOWN BY THE GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH THE OPPOSITION AND THE EXTREME RIGHT. THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH CONCERNED THE POCH MOST AT THAT TIME WERE: A) THE OPEN REBELLION OF THE EL TENIENTE COPPER WORKERS; B) THE POLICE PROTECTION WHICH WAS PROVIDED FOR A PATRIA Y LIBERTAD (P&L. EXTREME RIGHT-WING, MILITANTLY ANTI-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION CONGRESS IN TEMUCO: C) THE DECISION BY THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) TO MARCH TO RANCAGUA IN SUPPORT OF THE STRIKING MINERS; D) THE

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LACK OF FIRM GOVERNMENT ACTION DEALING WITH THE STRIKING BAKERS, WHO WERE DEFYING GOVERNMENT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST THE STRIKE! AND E) THE BELIEF BY THE PARTY THAT POCH MINISTERS WERE BEING IGNORED WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT.

3. THE PCCH PROTEST WAS MADE JOINTLY WITH THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PS) IN THE FORM OF A DEMAND THAT PRESIDENT SALVADOR A L L E N D E TAKE A FIRM STAND AGAINST THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND AGAINST THE TERRORISM OF THE EXTREME RIGHT OR FACE PUBLIC CRITICISM BY THE PCCH OF MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRA-TION, WHO THE POCH FELT DESERVED SUCH CRITICISM. ON 11 JUNE THE POCH CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECIDED THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION HAD REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE, IN THAT THE OPPOSITION HAD DEMONSTRATED ITS INTENTION TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT WHILE THE U.P., UP TO THAT POINT, HAD BEEN WASTING ITS TIME IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE OPPOSITION. THEREFORE, THE PCCH DECIDED TO MOVE THE OFFENSIVE AND TO SHIFT TO MORE EXTREMIST TACTICS, INCLUDING PREPARATIONS FOR VIOLENT ACTION. THE 29 JUNE UPRISING SERVED TO CONVINCE THE PCCH LEADERSHIP THAT VIOLENT CONFRONTATION COULD NOT BE AVOIDED AND THAT THEIR EARLIER DECISION TO PLACE THE PARTY ON A "WAR FOOTING" HAD BEEN CORRECT. THOWEVER, THE POCH LEADERSHIP WAS REPORTEDLY NOT COMPLETELY PLEASED BY THE RESPONSE

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
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OF THE WORKERS TO THE INITIAL CALL TO CONFRONT THE UPRISING,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT DEVELOPMENTS DID NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE
TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE WORKERS WOULD HAVE BEEN WILLING
TO TAKE TO THE STREETS TO CONFRONT THE MILITARY. ACCORDINGLY,
THE COMMUNISTS AFTER 29 JUNE BEGAN TO ACCELERATE THEIR PROGRAM
OF INCREASING THE PARTY'S PARAMILITARY CAPABILITY BY DISTRIBUTING WEAPONS TO THEIR MEMBERSHIP. THIS ACTION HAS BEEN EMULATED
BY THE PS AND THE UNITARY POPULAR ACTION MOVEMENT (MAPU). THE
QUANTITY AND TYPES OF WEAPONS BEING USSED TO U.P. SUPPORTERS
ARE NOT KNOWN.

4. AT THIS TIME THE PCCH HAS ADOPTED A POLITICAL LINE SIMILAR
TO THAT WHICH HAS LONG BEEN ADVOCATED BY THE MORE MILITANT PS AND
THE EXTREMIST MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR). THE
MAJOR FORCES OF THE U.P. GOVERNMENT ARE, THUS, NOW UNIFIED IN
A BELLIGERENT AND MORE RADICAL POSTURE. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS,
THE PCCH HAS CONCLUDED THAT IT NEEDS MORE TIME TO PREPARE ITS
ARMED CADREES. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS MAINTAINTING A PUBLIC
POSTURE IN FAVOR OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE PDC. WHILE THE
COMMUNISTS AND OTHER U.P. PARTIES MAY WELL OFFERE SOME CONCESSIONS
TO GET A DIALOGUE INITIATED AND TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST A TEMPORARY

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REDUCTION OF TENSIONS, THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR UNWILLINGNESS
TO RETURN THE BULK OF FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIES SEIZED IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE 29 JUNE UPRISING AND HAVE OTHERWISE INDICATED THAT
ANY CONCESION WILL BE MINIMAL.

5. THE 29 JUNE UPRISING HAS ALSO HAD AN IMPACT ON PRESIDENT ALLENDE AND HAS ADVERSELY AFFECTED HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN HIS DWN COALITION; HOWEVER, IT IS BELIEVED THAT 29 JUNE SERVED MORE TO CRYSTALLIZE A TREND WHICH HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO RESTIRCT THE INDEPENDECNE OF THE PRESIDENT. PRIOR TO 29 JUNE. THE POCH HAD BEGUN TO CRITICIZE THE PRESIDENT FOR BEING WEAL AND VACILLATING. SUBSEQUENT TO THAT DATE, REPORTING FROM THE PCCH INDICATES THAT THE PARTY POSITION IN THIS REGARD HAS HARDENED AND THAT THE POCH CONSIDERS ALLENDE TO THE THE EXECUTIVE INSTRUMENT THROUGH WHICH THE U.P. PARTIES NOW INTEND TO GOVERN. THUS, ALLENDE, THE CONSUMMATE POLITICIAN WHO HAS DEFUSED. PREVIOUS CIRISES THROUGH POLITICAL MANEUVERS AND COMPROMISE--AN ART IN-WHICH HE EXCELS -- MAY NOW FIND THIS ABILITY TO REPEAT PAST SUCCESSES TO BE MUCH MORE LIMITED. THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SUITED, EITHER PROFESSIONALLY OR PSYCHOLOGICALLY, TO THE ROLE OF A MERE FIGUREHEAD WITHIN HIS

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
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GOVERNMENT, AND HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO REGAIN HIS LEADERSHIP POSITION. THEREFORE, WHILE IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT ALLENDE HAS EMERGED FROM THE 29 JUNE UPRISING IN A WEAKER POSITION, IT IS ALSO PROBABLY TRUE THAT THIS COULD WELL BE A TEMPORARY PHENOMENON. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE U.P. GOVERNMENT COULD NOT EXIST WITHOUT ALLENDE, AND HIS VIEWS AND DESIRES MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY U.P. LEADERS. THE PRESIDENT HAS TWO POTENT WEAPONS AT THIS DISPOSAL IN ANY SHOWDOWN WITH THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES: I.E., HE CAN THREATEN TO CALL UPON THE MILITARY AND THE PDC TO FORM A NEW CABINET AND GOVERN WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE U.P. PARTIES, OR HE COULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN TO RESIGN AS A MEANS OF FORCING THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES INTO SUPPORTING HIS POLICIES. EITHER OF THESETWO THREATS WOULD BE EXTREME MEASURES AND WOULD PROBABLY ONLY BE FULFILLED IF THE PRESIDENT BECAME CONVINCED THE U.P. PARTIES WERE LEADING HIS GOVERNMENT INTO AN IRREVOCABLE CRISIS AND DESSTRUCTION.

6. IF ALLENDE IS ABLE TO REESTABLISH FIRM CONTROL OVER HIS COLAITION, OR IF HE IS ABLE TO CONVINCE U.P. LEADERS OF THE NEED TO COMPROMISE IN ORDER TO REDUCE POLITICAL TENSIONS AND FORESTALL



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A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION, THE ATTITUDE AND POSITION OF THE PDC. THE MAJOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTY, WILL BE KEY TO ANY THE PDC BY NATURE AND TRADITION FAVORS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. COMPROMISE OVER CONFRONTATION AND A POSSIBLE INTERRUPTION OF THIS IS DESPITE THE FACT THAT MORE THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. AND MORE OF ITS MEMBERSHIP HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY PESSIMISTIC OVER THE CHANCES OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS FACING CHILE AND FRANKLY FAVOR THE DOWNFALL OF THE GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY ITS OVERTHROW. THERE IS A SMALL BUT HIGHLY VOCAL AND HIGHLY VISIBLE SECTOR OF THE PDC LEADERSHIP WHICH DESIRES TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE MAJORITY OF PDC LEADERS, AND PROBABLY THE PARTY AS A WHOLE, IS DISPOSED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT ONLY IF IT CAN BE ASSURED THAT SOME PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES! TO WITE THE RETURN OF THE FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIES SEIZED FOLLOWING THE 29 JUNE UPRISING,

THE DISARMING OF THE WORKERS, AND THE PROMULGATION

OF THE THREE AREAS CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BILL. DEPENDING ON EVENTS,

THE U.P. PARTIES MAY BE WILLING TO MAKE SOME COMPROMISE CONCERNING

THE RETURN OF SOME OF THE SIEZED ECONOMIC UNITS, ESPECIALLY THOSE

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WITH SIGNIFICANT WEST EUROPEAN INVESTMENTS. THERE IS ALSO
A POSSIBILITY THAT SOME AGREEMENT CAN BE WORKED OUT REGARDING
THE WEAPONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE WORKERS IN THE
FACTORIES, ALTHOUGH IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE U.P. PARTIES WILL
CONTINUE THEIR PROGRAM OF ARMING AND TRAINING THEIR SELFDEFENSE UNITS IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY AGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER.
THE THIRD PDC CONDITION, THE PROMULGATION OF THE THREE AREAS
BILL, AFFECTS BASIC GOVERNMENT POLICY, AND IT IS NOT BELIEVED
THAT THE PROMULGATION OF THIS BILL COULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE
U.P. PARTIES.

7. WHILE PDC POLICY HAS NOT YET BEEN AGREED UPON.

INFORMATION

INDICATES THAT THE

PDC LEADERSHIP IS CONSIDERING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE ENTIRE

CABINET IF THE U.P. REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

THIS PDC ACTION WOULD BE DESIGNATED TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE

PRESIDENT AND OPEN THE WAY FOR MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE

CABINET WITH SUFFICIENT POWER TO MODERATE U.P. POLICIES.

THE PDC JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS ACTION WOULD BE THAT THE

GOVERNMENT HAS VIOLATED THE CONSTUTION BY BREAKING THE

ARMS CONTROL LAW, BY ESTABLISHING ARMED GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY,

BY NOT PROMULGATING THE THREE AREAS BILL, AND BY ILLEGALLY

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RE MORE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO THE U.P. THAN IS THE PDC. CAN
E EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE PDC INISITATIVE DESCRIBED ABOVE AND
RE ALSO PROMOTING AN EFFORT TO DECLARE THE PRESIDENT
NCOMPETENT UNDER ARTICLE 43 OF THE CONSTITUTION.

8. WHILE PERHAPS NOT CRITICAL, THE SITUATION WITHIN THE

RMED FORCES REMAINS VERY SERIOUS AT THE PRESENT TIME.

LIHOUGH THERE WERE OFFICERS IN ALL THREE OF THE CHILEAN

ILITARY SERVICES ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN PLOTTING PRIOR TO THE

9 JUNE UPRISING, THE ACT ITSELF BROUGHT A RADICAL CHANGE IN

TITUDE AT THE FLAG LEVEL OF THE ARMED FORCES.

4E UPSIRING POINTED OUT TO

4E HIGH COMMAND THE PRESSURES FROM THE LOWER LEVELS OF THE

RVICES FOR THE USE OF MILITARY POWER TO FORCE CHANGES

1 GOVERNMENT POLICIES. TO REGAIN CONTROL OVER SUBORDINATES

1D TO TRY TO PREVENT ABOTHER UNCOORDINATED INCIDENT, THE FLAG

1 VEL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN FORCED TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE

1 MAKING PLANS TO EITHER INFLUENCE OR OVERTHROW ALLENDE. AS

RESULT, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE AIR FORCE GENERAL STAFF THE WITH THE KNOWL
GE OF ITS COMMANDER IN CHIEF GENERAL CESAR

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
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RUIZ, IS PREPARED AND WILLING TO SUPPORT AN ARMY-LED COUP. THE NAVY ADMIRALS, ALSO WITH THE TACIT KNOWLEDGE, BUT WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF ITS COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ADMIRAL RAUL M O N T E R O, ALSO SEEMS READY TO MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. BOTH OF THESE SERGIVES CONTINUE TO AFFIRM, HOWEVER, THAT THEY CANNOT AND WULL NOT MOVE UNTIL THE ARMY IS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN FORCE. WITHIN THE ARMY, SOME GENERAL OFFICERS ARE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN TRYING TO PLAN AND ORGANIZE A COUP, AND THEY ARE COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE STRONG VERTICAL COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE ARMY INSTITUTION, THE PLOTTERS KNOW THAT AS LONG AS MARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, GENERAL CARLOS PRATS; THE COMMANDER OF THE SANTIAGO GARRISON, GENERAL MARIO SEPULVEDA: AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY TRAINING INSTITUTIONS, GENERAL PICKERING, DO NOT SUPPORT THEIR PLANS, A COUP MOVE MIGHT NOT SUCCEED. THE PROBLEM FACING THE ARMY PLOTTERS IS HOW TO CIRCUMVENT THESE THREE GENERALS. UNTIL THEY SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE ARMY AS A UNIFIED WHOLE WILL BE READY TO CARRY OUT A COUP. THE PLOTTING OFFICERS ARE NOW CONSIDERING THE MEANS TO OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM, AND




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RECENT REPORTING HAS INDICATED THAT A MAJORITY OF THE ARMY
GENERALS MIGHT REQUEST THE RETIRENT OF GENERAL PRATS. THE
CHANCES OF THIS MANEUVER SUCCEEDING MUST BE CONSIDERED DOUBTFUL,
SINCE PRATS SHOWS LITTLE INCLINATION TO BE FORCED OUT. THE
ONLY OTHER WAY TO REMOVE PRATS, SEPULVEDA AND PICKERING WOULD
APPEAR TO BE BY ABDUCTION OR ASSASSINATION. WITH THE MEMORY
OF THE AFFAIR OF FORMER ARMY COMMANDER RENE S C H N E I D E R
EVER PRESENT IN THEIR MINDS, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE
PLOTTERS TO BRING THEMSELVES TO CARRY OUT SUCH AN ACT.
ALTHOUGH THE PLOTTING OFFICERS ARE CONFIDENT THATA MILITARY
MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORTHCOMING, THEY CANNOT
SET A TIME FRAME UNTIL THE ARMY PLOTTERS RESOLVE THEIR
PROBLEM.

SERVICES HAVE FORMED A COMMITTEE OF 15, COMPOSED OF FIVE
GENERALS EACH FROM THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE AND FIVE ADMIRALS,
TO CREATE A FORUM CAPABLE OF UNIFYING ATTITUDES AS WELL AS
FORMULATING JOINT STATEMENTS FOR PRESENTATION TO THE COMMANDERS
IN CHIEF AND THROUGH THEM TO ALLENDE. THEY HOPE THAT THROUGH
THIS MECHAMISM THE PRESSURES FROM BELOW CAN BE EASED

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
SUFFICIENTY TO AVOID ISOLATED INCIDENTS SUCH AS THAT OF 29 JUNE, OR AN UNCOORDINATED AND POORLY PLANNED COUP ATTEMPT.

MORE RECENT REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE COMMITTEE OF 15 WAS ABLE TO FORCE THE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF TO APPROVE THE FORMULATION ON AN URGENT BASIS OF A PLAN TO COUNTER INTERNAL INSURGENCY.

THIS PLAN COULD BE VITAL PARTY OF ANY FUTURE COUP ATTEMPT.

10: WHETHER OR NOT THE MILITARY WOULD BE WILLING TO AGAIN
PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT, IF CALLED UPON BY ALLENDE TO DO
SO, WOULD DEPEND UPON THE CONDITIONS WHICH THEY WOULD PLACE
ON THE PRESIDENT IN EXCHANGE FOR SUCH PARTICIPATION. IF,
FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESIDENT ACQUIESCED TO THEIR PREVIOUS DEMANDS
AND THEY ENETERED THE GOVERNMENT WITH REAL POWER AND WITH THE
CAPABILITY OF ELIMINATING ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT ACTS AND BLUNTING
THE MARXIST THRUST OF THE EXECUTIVE, THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL
PRESSURE ON THE ARMED FORCES TO ACCEPT, ESPECIALLY IF SUCH A
TOVE WERE TO BE FAVORED BY THE PDC. IN THIS MANNER, MILITARY
LEADERS, INCLUDING THE PLOTTERS, MIGHT FEEL THAT DEVELOPING
/IOLENCE AND CIVIL CONFRONTATION COULD BE AVOIDED AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION MAINTAINED. THERE IS,
TOWEVER, SUBSTANTIAL DISTRUST OF THE U.P. WITHIN THE MILITARY,

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AND IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD BE WILLING
TO REENTER THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT DEFINITE PRECONDITIONS
AND STRONG GUARANTEES.

- 11. THE ATTITUDE AND POSSIBLE SUPPORT OF THE CARABINEROS

  (NATIONAL UNIFORMED POLICE) IN RELATION TO A COUP REMAIN AN

  ENIGMA TO THE PLOTTERS, THUS FAR, THE POLICE HAVE APPEARED


  TO BE THE MOST LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ALL THE UNIFORMED SERVICES.

  HOWEVER, REPORTING

  EVENT OF A COUP THE CARABINEROS WOULD NOT CONFRONT THE MILITARY

  SERVICES.
- 12. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CHILEANS GUILDS HAVE A BEARING
  ON HOW THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION DEVELOPS OVER THE
  SHORT TERM. BECAUSE OF INCREASINGLY STRONG MEASURES TAKEN BY.
  THE U.P. TO ESTABLISH STATE CONTROLS OVER BUSINESS AND THE
  PROFESSIONS, THE GUILDS FIND THEMSELVES IN A DESPERATE SITUATION,
  TO THE POINT THAT THEY FEEL THEIR VERY EXISTENCE IS THREATEENED.
  RECENT INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THE PRIVATE TRUCK OWNERS CONFEDERTION (SIDUCAM) IS PLANNING TO CALL A NATIONAL STRIKE SOMETIME IN THE
  NEAR FUTURE. PRIVATE BUSOWNERS, TAXI OPERATORS, BANKWORKERS,
  STUDENTS AND TECHNICAL/PROFESSIONAL GUILS HAVE PLEDGED TO JOIN

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THE STRIKERS. THEIR STRIKE IS DESIGNED TO PROVOKE MASSIVE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE GOVERNMENT OR A COUP.

THE PLANNED STRIKES,

THE PEAK STAGES NOT MOVE DURING THE PEAK STAGES

TALLE RUTTEN, THE MERSONUM COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED FOR

SALET PERIOD AND THE STRIKES WOULD BE EROKEN.

THE ADJUITY OF MOST OF THE GUILDS TO FUNCTION AS PRIVATE

ENTENDED TO THE GUILDS TO FUNCTION AS PRIVATE

ENTENDED TO THE GUILDS TO FUNCTION AS PRIVATE

ENTENDED TO THE GUILD HAVE BEEN DEALT A FATAL BLOW. FOR

THE ADJUITY OF MOST OF HE STRIKES INCLUDES IN SOME CASES

THE ADJUITY AS POSTINGUES OF VIOLENCE, TO MAKE THE

THE ADJUITY AS POSTINGUES DUILD LEADERS OF THEIR INTENTIONS.

THE ADJUITY HAVE ECEIVED NO COMMITMENT THAT THE

WHAT TO THE STRIKES IN THE MANNER RESIRED.

THE COULD ALSO HAVE AN IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SOME OF CARRIED OUT THE 29 JULIE UPRISING AND, AS A

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RESULT. IT STOP LEADERSHIP HAS GONE INTO EXILE. NEVERTHELESS,
THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT, ROBERTO THIEME,
WHO WAS IN ARGENTINA DURING THE 29 UPRISING, HAS NOW

RETURNED
TO CHILE AND VOWED TO INITIATE A TERROR
AND URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE CAMPAIGN AIMED AT OVERTHROWING
THE GOVERNMENT. P&L HAS ALREADY CARRIED OUT SOME TERRORIST
BOMBING AND MAY BE CONSIDERING KIDNAPPING AND ASSASSINATIONS.
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT P&L IN AND BY ITSELF HAS THE.
CAPABILITY FOR MORE THAN ISOLATED INCIDENTS OF THIS NATURE,
HICH NEVERTHELESS COULD CONSIDERABILITY INCREASE THE PRESENT
CLIMATE OF TENSION IN THE COUNTRY.

14. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE TEND TO BEAR OUT THE 'OLITICAL LINE THE CHILEAN MIR HAS ALWAYS ADOPTED; I.E., THAT ONFRONTATION IS INEVITABLE AND THAT THE U.P. MUST PREPARE OR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, THE PCCH DOES NOT INTEND OF ALLOW THE MIR TO ASSUME ANY DOMINATE VOICE IN U.P. POLICY, ESPITE THE CURRENT CLOSENESS OF THEIR TWO POLITICAL LINES. HEIR RIVALRY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE. ALSO, THE MIR, THE SEXTREME LEFTIST WING AND OTHER CHILEAN EXTREMIST GROUPS AN BE EXPECTED TO REACT ADEVERSLEY AND PERHAPS VIOLENTLY TO

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ANY MOVE TOWARD A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION FORCES. SINCE THE OCTOBER 1972 NATIONAL STRIKE PERIOD, THE MIR HAS DEVELOPED A COHERENT POLITICAL LINE WHICH HAS EVIDENTLY APPEALED TO INCREASING NUMBERS OF CHILEAN WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES. WHILE IT STILL MAY NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO AFFECT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE IN A DECISIVE WAY, IT DOES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZED AGITATION WHICH CAN ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE CURRENT TENSIONS.

15. WITH REGARD TO THE ECONOMY, AND CONTRARY TO OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, THE GOVERNMENT ONLY MANAGED TO KEEP THE ECONOMY AFLOAT BY MEANS OF SHORT-TERM CREDITS AND OTHER FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AMOUNTING TO MORE THAN U.S. \$330 MILLION IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1973 ALDNE, AND BY FINANCIAL MANIPULATIONS SUCH AS DEFAULTING OR POSTPONING: PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST PAYMENTS ON OUTSTANDING LOANS. BOTH THE SHORT-TERM LOANS AND THE EARNINGS FROM COPPER SALES HAVE BEEN USED TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL IMPORTS IN THE FACE OF STEADILY DECLINING PRODUCTION RATES. HOWEVER, BY

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GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO POSTPONE DRASTIC AND UNPOPULAR

ECONOMIC MEASURES UNTIL IT FIRMLY ESTABLISHES BOTH ECONOMIC

AND POLITICAL CONTROL. FOLLOWING THE 29 JUNE UPRISING, THE

U.P. ACCELERATED ITS EFFORT TO GAIN TOTAL CONTROL OVER THE

ECONOMY BY ILLEGALLY SEIZING ADDITIONAL FACTORIES. THE GOVERN
MENT, THUS FAR, HAS ALLOWED THESE FACTORIES TO REMAIN UNDER

THE CONTROL OF THESE GROUPS AND APPARENTLY INTENDS TO ABSORB MOST OF

THEM INTO THE PUBLIC SECTOR. AS LONG AS SHORT-TERM CREDITS

AND COPPER EARNINGS ARE AVAILABLE IN SUFFICIENT GUANTITY TO

COVER THE COST OF ESSENTIAL IMPORTS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL

CONTINUE TO POSTPONE NEEDED DRASTIC AND UNPOPULAR ECONOMIC

MEASURES, BUT THE EVER-INCREASING VOLUME OF IMPORTS AND THE

RISING COSTS OF THOSE IMPORTS ARE PLACING A HEAVY FINANCIAL

BURDEN ON THE ECONOMY.

16. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN, CHILE NOW IMPORTS
APPROXIMATELY 40 PER CENT OF THE FOOD PRODUCTS ITS CONSUMES.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IS EXPECTED TO DECLINE SOME 12 TO 15

PER CENT ON THE 1972-1973 AGRICULTURAL YEAR OVER THE VERY LOW

YIELDS OF THE 1971-1972 CROP YEAR. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS ALONE

ARE FORECAST AT ABOUT U.S. \$520 MILLION, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY

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U.S. \$100 MILLION MORE THAN IN 1972. THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS CONTINUAING ITS PROGRAM OF FARM EXPROPRIATION DESPITE THE LACK OF ADEQUATE FARM MANAGERS AND TECHNICIANS, HAS NOT BEEN! SUCCESSFUL IN EXPLOTING ITS AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES, AND IT HAS LIMITED THE WILL AND INITIATIVE OF THE PRIVATE LAND OWNERS TO INCREASE THEIR YIELDS. EVENTUALLY, THE GOVERNMENT PROBABLY WILL BEGIN TO UNDERTAKE MEASURE TO CONTROL THE THRIVING AGRICULTURAL BLACK MARKER AND, AS THIS OCCURS, PRIVATE FARMERS CAN BE EXPECTED TO REDUCE THEIR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND, THEREFORE, THE 1973-1974 CROP YEAR IS LIKELY TO PRODUCE EVEN ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS THUS FAR LOWER DOMESTIC YIELDS. EVADED THE PREDICTED ACUTE SHORTAGES IN THE WINTER OF 1973 BY IMPORTING MORE FOOD PRODUCTS, QUEUES HAVE BECOME QUITE COMMON AT RETAIL FOOD OUTLETS AND TEMPORARY SHORTAGES OF BREAD. LIQUID GAS AND OTHER ESSENTIAL PRODUCTS HAVE PLAGUED EVERYONE. MOST OBSERVERS PREDICT MORE ACUTE AGRICULTURAL SHORTAGES EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO SPEND ITS EARNINGS AND SHORT TO TERM CREDITS ON IMPORTS, AND SOME FORM OF CENTRALIZED FOOD DISTRIBUTION OR RATIONAING SYSTEM MAY BE NECESSARY.

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17. IN SUMMARY, WITHIN THE LAST FEW WEEKS AND MONTHS, THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT TRENDS IN THE OVERALL POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION HAVE OCCURED: A) THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE HAS ADDOPTED A POSITION ADVOCATING ACCELERATED REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE PS AND THE MIR AND IT NO LONGER IS PLAYING THE CONCILIATORY AND MODERATING ROLE OF THE PAST; B) THE ARMED FORCES HAVE BECOME INVOLVED POLITICALLY, WITH THE BULK OF THE INSTITUTION FAVORING ACTION TO CHANGE THE CORSE OF EVENTS EITHER THROUGH MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT OR, IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE , THROUGH AN OVERTHROW OF THEIR REGIME: C) THE PDC, WHILE STILL DESIRING TO MAINTAIN THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY, HAS ALSO BECOME LESS CONCILIATORY IN ITS POSTURE VIS-A-VIS THE U.P. AND IS MORE WILLING TO RUN THE RISKS OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DOWNFALL OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT; D) PRESIDENT ALLENDE'S ROOM FOR POLITICAL MANEUVER HAS BECOME MUCH MORE CIRCUMSCRIBED; AND E) IN THE ECONOMIC AREA THE COUNTRY REMAINS IN A DOWNWARD SPIRAL BUT STILL REMAINS VIABLE OVER THE SHORT TERM. THE U.P. CONTINUES TO GIVE HIGHER PRIORITY TO OBTAINING POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE ECONOMY RATHER THAN TO IMPROVING ITS PERFORMANCE.

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- 18. GIVEN THE ABOVE FACTORS. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE
  PRINCIPAL WAYS THE SITUATION COULD DEVELOP IN THE NEXT THREE =
  TO-SIX-MONTH PERIOD: A) CONTINUATION OF THE ACUTE CONFLICT
  BETWEEN THE U.P. AND THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION WITH NO
  NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE CORRELATION OF FORCES; B) A GRADUAL
  SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF POWER TOWARD THE U.P. DURING A PERIOD
  OF PRATORACTED CONFLICT; C) REENTRANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES INTO
  THE GOVERNMENT BUT WITH SUFFICIENT POWER TO ALTER THE THRUST
  OF THE REVOLUTION; ) A MILITARY OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT.
  AT A LOWER LEVEL OF PROBABILITY ARE TWO ADDITIONAL CONCEINBLE
  DEVELOPMENTS: A) A MILITARY COUP LED BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
  OF THE ARMY IN COORDINATION WITH PRESIDENT ALLENDE AND B)
  CIVIL WAR.
- 19. WITH THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE, AS WELL AS A LARGE SEGMENT
  OF THE ARMY, PSYCHOLOGICALLY PREPARED FOR A COUP AND WITH
  ACTIVE PLOTTING GOING ON IN ALL THREE SERVICES LED BY OFFICERS
  OF FLAG RANK, A MILITARY OVERTHROW OF THE PRESENT REGIME HAS
  TO BE CONSIDERED AS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY IN THE PRESENT
  SITUATION. THE PRINCIPAL DETERRENTS TO THIS DEVELOPMENT ARE THE
  LACK OF SUFFICIENT COMMAND STRENGTH BY THE ARMY PLOTTERS IN

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THE SANTIAGO AREA AND A FAIRLY BROAD PREFERENCE IN THE ARMED FORCES AS A WHOLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE THROUGH REENTERING THE GOVERNMENT IN STRENGTH RATHER THAN THROUGH A COUP. IF THE ARMY PLOTTERS ARE UNABLE TO SOLVE THEIR PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP IN THE SANTIAGO AREA, THE ARMED FORCES AS A WHILE COULD REDUCE THEIR DEMANDS RELATING TO THEIR REENTRANCE INTO THE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN HAVE THINGS GO ON AS THEY ARE. GIVEN THE STRONG ANTI-GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES OF THE BULK OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE PRESENT UNIFIED TACTICS OF THE U.P. TO PUSH FOR REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE U.P. WOULD PROPOSE FOR REENTRANCE INTO THE GOVERNMENT IF THIS WOULD MEAN LOSS OF THEIR PRESENT MOMENTUM. THUS, REENTRANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES INTO THE GOVERNMENT COULD WELL BE BLOCKED BY THE U.P.

APPEARS TO BE TO TAKE OVER AS MANY KEY FACTORIES AS THEY CAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TO ENLARGE. THEIR CONTROL OVER THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ARE PURSUING AN ACCELERATED CAMPAIGN TO TRAIN AND ARM THEIR PARAMILITARY CADRES. THEIR STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE TO ACQUIRE SUCH BROAD CONTROL OVER THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF THE COUNTRY WHICH, WHEN COUPLED WITH

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HEIR EXISTING POPULAR SUPPORT, GROWING PARAMILITARY STRENGTH

ND THEIR CONTROL OF KEY ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY IN THE SANTIAGO

REA, WOULD GIVEN THEM SUCH OVERWHELMING POWER AS TO END THE THREAT

ROM THE DISAFFECTED PARTS OF THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH SHEER

NTIMIDATION. THE UPRISING OF 29 JUNE DEMONSTRATED TO THE

.P. HOW ILL-PREPARED: IT WAS TO MEET THE THREAT OF A COUP, AND

T IS STRIVING TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

T IS NOT KNOWN HOW MUCH TIME THE U.P. THINKS IT NEEDS TO DO SO.

HUS, THE DYNAMICS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, IF CONTINUED FOR

NY LENGTH OF TIME, CLEARLY FAVORS THE U.P. AND POSES A GRAVE

HREAT TO THE LONG-TERM EXISTENCE OF THE OPPOSITION.

21. THE THREAT POSED BY THE U.P. CURRENT OFFENSIVE IS
ECOGNIZED BY THE OPPOSITION. THEY REALIZE IT MUST BE STOPPED.
HIS IS WHY THE GUILDS ARE AGAIN THINKING IN TERMS OF A NATIONAL
TRIKE (ALMOST OUT OF DESPEARATION) AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES
RE CONSIDERING IMPEACHING THE ENTIRE CABINET OR EVEN PROCEEDING
GAINST PRESIDENT ALLENDE BASED ON ARTICLE 43 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
F THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE ENTIRE CABINET IS UNDERTAKEN BY THE
PROSITION IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT SITUATION OR AS A RESULT
F A STRIKE BY THE GUILDS, IT WOULD TEND TO PLACE THE PRESIDENT

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
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IN THE FOREFRONT AGAIN AND PROVIDE HIM WITH ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY
TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE ARMED FORCES CONCERNING REENTRANCESE
INTO THE GOVERNMENT AND ARRANGE THEREBY A POLITICAL TRUCE.
WHETHER HE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL, HOWEVER, REMAINS QUESTIONABLE.

- POSSIBILITY OF EXTREME ACTS BY EITHER P&LOR THE MIR, AND
  THE RIGIDITY IN THE POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS POWER GROUPS,
  IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE WITH ANY DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE
  AT THIS TIME WHICH OF THE FOREGING FOUR POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
  IS THE MOST LIKELY IN THE NEXT THREE-TO-SIX MONTH PERIOD.
  WHILE THE HISTORY OF PAST PERIODS OF HIGH TENSION WOULD TEND
  TO INDICATE THAT THIS CRISIS COULD ALSO PASS WITHOUT A
  SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE TWO
  DPPOSITING FORCES IN CHILE, WE ARE NOT AS CONFIDENT OF THIS
  OUTCOME AS WE HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST, UNLESS THE ARMED FORCES
  VIGOROUSLY PURSUE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMS CONTROL LAW
  AND THE NATIONAL POLICE ARE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO END ILLEGAL
  TAKEOVERS OF FACTORIES AND FARMS.
- 23. THE HIGH DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE PRESENT
  SITUATION AND THE STRONG POLITICAL CROSS-CURRENTS LEAD ONE TO
  CONSIDER SOME LESS LIKELY POSSIBILITIES OTHER THAN THE MORE
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


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OBVIOUS ONES GIVEN ABOVE. GIVEN PRESIDENT ALLENDE'S STRONG DESIRE TO REMAIN IN POWER, HIS PREDISPOSITION TO LEAD RATHER THAN TO BE LED, CONSIDERING THE AMBITIONS OF GENERAL CARLOS PRATS, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY, AS WELL AS THE RELATIONSHIP THEY HAVE BETWEEN THEM,

IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT ALLENDE AND PRATS WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES COULD ATTEMPT TO SET UP A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. ITS POLITICAL BASE WOULD BE THE PDC AND THE MODERATE SECTORS OF THE U.P. IN ADDITION. THE IDEA THAT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE U.P. AND THE OPPOSITION COULD LEAD TO A CIVIL WAR MAY NOT BE AS FAR-FETCHED AS IT ONCE WAS. THE CONSTANTLY RISING DEGREE OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS, THE ARMING OF CIVILIANS OF BOTH SIDES (THE U.P. IS PROBABLY DOING A BETTER JOB OF THIS), THE DIVISION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES, THE REALIZATION BY A LARGE SECTOR OF THE OPPOSITION THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A POLITICAL OR MILITARY SOLUTION IS INCREASINGLY REMOTE, AND THE RIGIDITY OF THE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING GROUPS. THEND TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THIS IDEA. STILL, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THESE TWO CONCELVABLE DEVELOPMENTS STILL SEEM TO BE FAIRLY



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